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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TONYIA B # JENSEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 11458

vs.
CLARK EVON JENSEN,
Defendant and Appellant#

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for divorce.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondent agrees with appellantfs statement as to the disposition of the case in the lower court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the court affirm the lower court's
judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The decree of the lower court dissolved a marriage of twentyone and one-half years duration.
of the marriage.

Three children were born as issue

The oldest child, a girl, was 18; the second child,

a girl, was a few days short of 16; and Tony, the boy, was nine and
one-half.
The parties were married when the husband was 20 and the wife
was 16. At the time of the marriage the husband was a high school
-1- Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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graduate, and the wife was still in high school.

After the mar-

riage the husband wenc on continuing four years of technical
training at the technical college. (Tr. 7)* The wife continued on
with her education and obtained a degree in nursing and practiced
as a registered nurse. (Tr. 7). Twenty of the 21 years the parties
were married the wife worked outside of the home. (Tr. 7). The
parties income was never big, but the wife took a real estate course
at Stevens Henager College, and then engaged in real estate transactions.

The wife claims that this is how their money was accumu-

lated. (Tr. 12) #
The marriage deteriorated to the extent that the wife was
threatened with guns and physical violence.

(Tr. 9 ) .

Paragraph four of the Findings of Fact, states:
"The Court finds that the marriage between the parties
has deteriorated because the difference in interests and
goals which have developed between the parties over the
past years, and that the differences in the plaintiff
seeking work outside the home and the defendant demanding
domestic obedience and service from her have caused mental
and physical anguish and suffering to both parties entitling
each to a decree of divorce from the other.11
It was suggested at trial that both parties should be awarded
a divorce.

(Tr. 46). The court found that certain property had beei

acquired during the marriage and distributed the property approximate
equal between the parties. (To visualize refer to Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 6,)

*

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN AWARDING PROPERTY AND CASH
TO THE PLAINTIFF IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO FIFTY (50%) PERCENT
OF THE TOTAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY THE PARTIES DURING THEIR
MARRIAGE?
f,

When a decree of divorce is made the court may make such
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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orders in relation to the children,1 property and parties,
as may be equitable,"

0

..

Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953)*

This court has said repeatedly that each divorce case is a unique"',
fact situation and that the lox^er courts are permitted to do that
which is equitable and just within the broad range of facts presented
to them.
In a per curiam opinion by this court, Anderson v. Anderson,
18 U.2d 286, 422 P.2d 192, it was said that:
The court frequently emphasized that fno firm rule
can be uniformly applied in all divorce cases, * * * each
must be determined upon the basis of the immediate fact
situation. * * * Recent pronouncements of this court,
and the policy to which we adhere, are to the effect that
the trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion
in such matters and that his judgment should not be
changed lightly, and in fact, not at all, unless it works
such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a
clear abuse of discretion.'
The extent of this discretion is emphasized by the
great disparity of results allowed in differing factual
situations. In Blair v. Blair, 40 Utah 306, 121 pu 19
38 L.R^A.NfS., 269 (1912), the court upheld a property
division awarding $40,000 to the husband and $4,500 to
the wife, even though the divorce had been granted in
her favor. At the other extreme, in Wilson v. Wilson,
5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956) where fthe court
awarded her substantially all of the property possessed
by the parties1 (in excess of $20,000 to the wife and
approximately $500 to the husband), the decree was also
affirmed. The court has sustained the one-third,
two-thirds property division used by the trial court
in the present case, without regard to which party was
granted the divorce. Wooley v. Wooley, 113 Utah 391,
195 P.2d 743 (1948); Griffin v. Griffin, 18 Utah 98,
55 P 84 (1898) (In Griffin this proportion was approved
by analogy to the rights of the widow to succeed to
one-third of her deceased husband's estate at common law).
This case indicates the outward extremes which have been approved
by the court as well as the middle ground of the one-third,
two-thirds property division.

All of this, however, is prefaced

by the thought that there can be no firm rule in divorce cases
because of the diversity of facts and the discretion of the court
with respect to those facts.
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This court in Searle v. Searle, 522 P. 2d 697, approved an
award to a wife of real and personal property, in lieu of permanent
alimony, representing approximately one-half of the property
accumulated during 27 years of marriage.
In the case now being considered by the court, Tonyia Jensen
had worked outside the home and contributed her earnings toward
the estate accumulated, and further had taken a course in real
estate management and according to her testimony, which was not
disputed by the defendant, most of the estate the parties had was
accumulated by dealing in real property.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Rule 59 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on
all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes;
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment
if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings,
and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment;
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or
adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of
discretion by which either party was prevented from having
a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more
of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general
or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted
to them by the court, by reaort to a determination by chance
or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by
the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could
not have guarded against:.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party
making the application, which he could not, with reasonable

-4-
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diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
(5)
Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice*
(6)
Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict
or other decision, or that it is against law.
(7)

Error in law.

(b)
Time for Motion, A motion for a new trial shall be
served not later than 10 days after the entry of the
judgment.
(c)
Affidavits; Time for Filing. When the application
for a new trial is made under subdivision (1), (2), (3),
or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a
motion for a new trial is based upon affidvits they shall
be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days
after such service within which to serve opposing affidavits.
The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits
shall be served may be extended for an additional period
not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court
may permit reply affidavits.
(d)
On Initiative of Court. Not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order
a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted
a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e)
Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter
or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days
after entry of the judgment.
Respondent's position to appellant's claim of error in denying
defendant's motion for a new trial is that the evidence is sufficient
to justify the decision and if specific errors of law are claimed
such errors should be pointed out.
Appellant says in affect, maybe my evidence wasn't strong enough
at the trial to persuade the judge, but if you will give me another
chance I'll produce better evidence.
CONCLUSION
The lower court handled in a fair and equitable manner the
property distribution in this case
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Respondent feels that
the trial
court
has rendered a fair result

for both p a r t i e s and would , t h e r e f o r e , ask t h i s court to affirm
the judgment.
Respectfully
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48 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: 375-3000
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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STATE OF UTAH )
: ss
COUNTY OF UTAH)

r

Ruth Nehring
says:

being first duly sworn,

That she is employed in the office of IVIE & YOUNG,

Attorneys herein for Plaintiff and Respondent,
that she served the attached Brief of Respondent
upon Supreme Court and Defendant
by placing a correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to;
Michael Kodak, Jr*
Supreme Court Clerk
State Capital Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Gary H. Weight
Attorney at Law
43 East 200 North
Provo, Utah 84601
That she deposited the same, sealed with first class
postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Prove,
Utah, on the j[0

day of June, 1976<

tJt

Subscribed and sworn to before me this Jo ~

^

J

day of

June, 1976.

dcL^m
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EOTARTTPUBLIC
'
Residing in Utah County, Utah
My Commission Expires:
S""jS'?f
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